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Passive Acknowledgement or Active Promotion of
Religion? Neutrality and the Ten Commandments in
Green v. Haskell
I. INTRODUCTION
In Green v. Haskell, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the
Haskell County Board of Commissioners’ decision to approve a
private citizen’s request to erect a monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments on the lawn of the county courthouse violated the
1
Establishment Clause. With reasoning based primarily on Justice
O’Connor’s “Endorsement Test,” 2 the court found that under the
unique circumstances of the case, a reasonable observer would view
the government’s decision to allow the display of the Ten
Commandments as having the “principle or primary effect of
endorsing religion,” and thus the display violated the Establishment
Clause. 3
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit erred in finding that the
monument in Haskell County violated the Establishment Clause.
The Tenth Circuit failed to apply the controlling precedent of Van
Orden v. Perry 4 to find that the monument in Haskell County was a
constitutionally acceptable, neutral acknowledgement of the religious
history of this nation. Instead, the court incorrectly distinguished
Van Orden both by using an unrealistic “reasonable observer” 5
standard requiring a clear secular purpose for the erection of the
monument, and by incorrectly attributing the divisiveness
surrounding the lawsuit to the unconstitutional effect of the
monument.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Haskell County, located in Southeastern Oklahoma, has a small
population of about 15,000 people. 6 The courthouse is located in
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
Green, 568 F.3d at 799.
545 U.S. 677 (2005).
Green, 568 F.3d at 799.
Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1274 (E.D. Okla. 2006),
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Stigler, the county seat, and is situated in the middle of a square
block of county property, which also contains a rustic cabin for the
Haskell County Historic Society, a gazebo used for activities ranging
from political rallies to symphonies, and a lawn where a number of
public and private events take place. The lawn contains a number of
marble monuments “spread willy-nilly,” which were mostly paid for
and erected by private citizens of Haskell County. 7
Although no written policy exists regarding the types of
monuments allowed to decorate the lawn, the theme of the
monuments could arguably be construed as relating to the historical
significance of Haskell County and the United States in general. 8
The largest monument, situated directly in the center of the lawn,
honors Haskell County citizens who died in World War I and World
9
War II. There are also smaller monuments including one that
honors those who were killed in action in Vietnam and Korea; a rose
garden with a bird bath; a flag pole with the American Flag; a large
monument for the Choctaw Nation; two marble benches dedicated
to and inscribed by the local high school classes of 1954 and 1955;
white billboards with advertisements for various churches; a section
for “personal message” bricks from private sponsors; and, of course,
the recently added monument displaying the Ten Commandments. 10
The plans for the addition of the Ten Commandments
monument began in 2004 when a private citizen named Mike Bush
attended a regularly scheduled meeting for the Board of County
Commissioners and asked for permission to erect a monument with
the Ten Commandments. 11 Mr. Bush said that he would take care of
all expenses for the project. 12 The Board discussed the historic
aspects of the project, but it did not discuss any religious aspects of
the decision to allow the monument’s erection. 13 Mr. Bush was
granted permission, and he proceeded to design the monument and

rev’d sub nom. Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1275 (“The lawn monuments have no apparent central theme to the amateur
eye. One could argue that they all have some tenuous connection to the history of Haskell
County.”).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1276.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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raise funds for the project. 14 As an afterthought, Mr. Bush decided,
without approval from the Board, to add the text of the Mayflower
Compact. 15 The monument was erected on the courthouse lawn on
November 5, 2004, and an unveiling ceremony organized by Mr.
Bush followed days later consisting primarily of impromptu religious
speeches. 16 Two of the commissioners attended the ceremony. 17
After the unveiling of the monument and the initial media
coverage, there was a period of relative calm until James Green filed
a lawsuit on October 6, 2005, claiming that he was “offended by the
Monument because he believes its text is presented as a mandate and
is thus an endorsement by the government of religious matters.” 18
Following the initiation of the lawsuit, Mr. Bush circulated a petition
and organized a rally in support of the monument, and the
commissioners made statements in support of the monument. 19 The
district court held that Haskell County did not violate the
Establishment Clause by approving a private citizen’s plan to erect a
monument, 20 and Mr. Green appealed to the Tenth Circuit. 21
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Secular Emphasis of the Three-Pronged Lemon Test
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman, a
seminal Establishment Clause case in which the Court considered
whether programs that supplemented and reimbursed parochial
schools for secular teachers’ salaries were unconstitutional. 22 The
Court articulated the famous “Lemon test,” which explains that to
survive Establishment Clause scrutiny a government action must (1)
have a secular legislative purpose, (2) neither advance nor inhibit
religion as its principal or primary effect, and (3) not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. 23 Based on this test, the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1276.
Id.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1279–80.
Id. at 1296.
Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612–13.
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Court found that the programs in question were unconstitutional 24
because their “cumulative impact” involved “excessive entanglement
between government and religion.” 25 Lemon’s progeny seems to
suggest that the purpose of government action must be exclusively
secular and that any religious motivations warrant invalidation. 26
Shortly after deciding Lemon, the Supreme Court began to
distance itself from the rigid application of that test. For instance,
just two years after Lemon, the Court explained that the factors
identified in Lemon served as “no more than helpful signposts.” 27 In
some cases, the Court refrained from using the Lemon test entirely. 28
Furthermore, the Court soon began to develop alternative forms of
analysis for analyzing Establishment Clause issues.
B. The Lemon Test Refined by O’Connor’s “Endorsement Patina”

29

In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, a case dealing
with a government-purchased nativity scene on display during
Christmas, 30 Justice O’Connor articulated another way of
conceptualizing the Lemon test.” 31 O’Connor explained that when
the government endorses a particular religion, it “sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.” 32
To determine whether or not the government has endorsed
religion, O’Connor set forth a two part analysis: first, the court must
ask what the message was that the government intended to
communicate; and second, the court must ask what message the

24. Id. at 607.
25. Id. at 614.
26. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308–09 (2000); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–93 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56–61 (1985);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
27. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (upholding the use of
prayer in the context of legislative and deliberative bodies based on the “history and tradition
of this country”).
29. Green, 568 F.3d at 796.
30. 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 687.
32. Id. at 688.
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government actually, objectively conveyed to the community. 33 If
either the government intended to endorse or actually endorsed
religion, based on the specific facts of the situation, then the
government activity must be invalidated. 34 O’Connor argued that
“[e]very government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or
disapproval of religion.” 35 Thus it is necessary to closely analyze the
specific context and audience of each case to determine whether the
message sent by the government had the effect of endorsing religion.
O’Connor’s test has come under heavy criticism in recent cases.
For instance, in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v.
Pinnette, a case dealing with private religious expression on
government property, Justice Scalia rejected O’Connor’s
endorsement test and argued that it supplied “no standard
whatsoever.” 36 Scalia argued that if the factually nuanced inquiry of
endorsement was used to scrutinize every neutral acknowledgment
of religion in a public forum, then officials would be forced “to
weigh a host of imponderables,” 37 such as how close to the building
was too close, what kind of building is being considered, what was
the specific context, what symbolic messages could be drawn, etc. 38
Thus, rather than require policy makers and government officials to
embark on a dizzying factual analysis of many degrees, Scalia
advocated a test that focused on the neutrality of the access to the
government property. 39 Though this test is not directly applicable to
the context of Ten Commandment monuments post Pleasant
Grove, 40 this test illustrates how the Court moved away from the
endorsement patina, as well as the Lemon test, which had a strong
secular emphasis, toward a standard focused much more on the
neutrality of the government action.

33. Id. at 690.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 694.
36. 515 U.S. 753, 768 (1995).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 770.
40. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009) (finding that a
permanent monument in a public area represents “a form of government speech” as opposed
to the private speech in Pinnette).
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C. Contrasting Government Involvement in Van Orden and
McCreary
In the Court’s most recent rulings discussing whether a
government display of the Ten Commandments violated the
41
Establishment Clause in the twin cases of Van Orden v. Perry and
42
McCreary County v. ACLU, the Court emphasized that the
“touchstone” for their analysis was “the principle that the ‘First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’” 43 The Court found
that the Van Orden display constituted a constitutional, neutral
acknowledgement of both the religious and historic nature of the
Ten Commandments because, inter alia, the monument was
inspired and paid for by a private organization, was erected amongst
multiple other monuments with a historic message, and the
government showed no particular preference to this monument. 44 In
contrast, the Court found that the McCreary display constituted a
violation of the Establishment Clause because the government issued
a legislative order requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments
in a high traffic area, displayed the Ten Commandments in an
exclusively religiously themed display, and demonstrated a sham
purpose of historic education which was dwarfed by the “clear
purpose” of advancing religious ideals. 45
Thus, while endorsement tends to focus on whether any
apparent favoritism or benefit was given to religion, the neutrality
test focuses on the nature of the government involvement with the
display. In determining the neutrality of government action in these
contrasting cases, the Court seemed to focus on whether the
government was passively acknowledging the religious and historic
nature of the display or actively and primarily promoting the
religious ideals embodied in the display. 46 The government
involvement was measured on a spectrum ranging between the
unconstitutional extremes of establishment and religious hostility,
41. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
42. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
43. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)).
44. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681–83.
45. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 852–55, 857.
46. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 687 (identifying the monument as “passive” representation
of the nation’s religious heritage); McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860 (finding that the “clear
purpose” of the county was to post the Commandments, not educate).
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with a constitutionally neutral range of passive acknowledgment in
between. 47
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
In Green v. Haskell, the Tenth Circuit determined that in this
case, a “reasonable observer” would find that the Ten
Commandments monument erected in Haskell County tended to
strongly reflect a government endorsement of religion, and thus it
violated the Establishment Clause. 48
A. Applying the Lemon Test Refined by O’Connor’s
“Endorsement Patina”
The Tenth Circuit first had to determine which Establishment
Clause test to apply in this case. The court admitted that the
Supreme Court had “harshly criticized” the Lemon test. 49 Indeed, in
Van Orden, the Supreme Court found that the Lemon test was “not
useful” in dealing with the passive placement of a Ten
Commandments monument. Instead, the Court focused on the
neutrality of government involvement with the display. 50
However, since the Supreme Court had never explicitly
overruled the Lemon test, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the test
still “cl[u]ng[] to life,” and remained the touchstone for
51
Establishment Clause analysis. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit
rejected the Supreme Court’s approach in Van Orden and chose
instead to apply the Lemon test “refined by Justice O’Connor’s
endorsement test.” 52 The critical issue under this analysis became
whether, as determined by a reasonable observer, the monument had
the principle effect of endorsing religion. 53
B. Viewing the Monument’s Effect through the
Eyes of a Reasonable Observer
The Tenth Circuit explained that determining the principal effect
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683–84.
Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 797 n.8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 788.
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of the monument is “predominantly” a “fact driven” inquiry. 54 This
prong of analysis looks through the eyes of a reasonable observer
who, though not omniscient, would have access to more information
regarding the monument than most members of the actual
community. 55 From the reasonable observer standpoint, the court
argued that many facts particular to this case resulted in the Board
violating the Establishment Clause. For example, in addition to
attributing the ordinary knowledge of a member of the small Haskell
County community to the reasonable observer, the court explained
that the reasonable observer would be aware that Mr. Bush revealed
to the Board his religious motivation for erecting the monument,
and the Board shortly thereafter granted permission for Mr. Bush to
56
erect it. The court also assumed that a reasonable observer would
also know the exact location of the monument and its special
57
relationship to other monuments. Additionally, the reasonable
observer was assumed to know of the legal advice given to board
58
members regarding the constitutionality of the monument.
Moreover, the reasonable observer was assumed to understand the
significance of the contrast in the timing of the initiation of the
59
lawsuits resulting in Van Orden and Green. Finally, the reasonable,
but not omniscient, observer was assumed to know that the
Mayflower Compact was added to the monument after Mr. Bush
received official authorization and without additional approval of the
Board. 60
The court admitted that some facts weighed against the Board’s
approval of the monument violating the Establishment Clause. First,
“the Monument was one of numerous other monuments” and
displays. 61 Additionally, the Ten Commandments were accompanied
by the Mayflower Compact, a document with clear historic
significance to our country. 62 The court reasoned, however, that the
monument being one of multiple monuments would likely mean less
54.
2008)).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

10

Id. at 798 (citing Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1022 (10th Cir.
Id. at 799–800.
Id. at 801 n.10.
Id. at 800.
Id. at 800 n.10.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 801, 807.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 807.
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to the reasonable observer since the Haskell County display had a
less cohesive and unifying secular theme than the display in Van
Orden, 63 and the inclusion of the Mayflower Compact would mean
less to the reasonable observer since he or she would be aware that it
was added without the Board’s knowledge or approval. 64 Thus, these
facts did not mitigate in favor of finding that the monument was a
constitutionally permissible display in the eyes of the reasonable
observer.
C. Divisive Reactions and a Lack of Clear Secular Purpose are Deemed
to Create the Effect of Government Endorsement
In its final determination that the monument’s primary effect was
the appearance of government endorsement of religion, the court
placed special emphasis on two particular issues: the divisive nature
of the timing and reaction to the lawsuit, and the lack of a clear
secular purpose for the erection of the monument.
The court emphasized the divisive nature of the lawsuit and
related reactions. The court pointed to the fact that, in Green, the
lawsuit was filed fairly quickly—almost a year after the erection of the
monument—when compared to the lawsuit filed forty years after the
erection of the monument in Van Orden. 65 In relying on Justice
Breyer’s lone concurring opinion in Van Orden, the Green court
reasoned that the “years of tranquility” suggest that reasonable
observers would not view the monument as favoring or promoting
religion. 66 The court also emphasized the fact that Mr. Bush
organized a rally and petition to support the monument after the
lawsuit began and that one commissioner defended it at the rally,
saying that he would stand in front of the monument and people
would “have to push [him] down with it.” 67 The court concluded
that these activities weighed heavily toward creating an appearance of
government endorsement. 68
The court also put significant emphasis on the lack of a clear
secular purpose for erecting the monument. Interestingly, the court

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 805–06.
Id. at 807–08.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 806–07.
Id. at 792, 801.
Id. at 801–02.
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did not examine the secular purpose as a separate prong of the
Lemon analysis, but rather considered it under the umbrella of the
effect prong. For instance, the court explained that if the
commissioners would have voiced “a secular purpose for the
installation of the monument,” it would have made it easier for the
reasonable observer to see that religion was not being endorsed. 69
Statements by the commissioners recognizing the religious nature of
the monument were also deemed to increase the appearance of
endorsement. 70
V. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit incorrectly held that the Board of
Commissioners violated the Establishment Clause when the Board
authorized a private citizen to erect the Ten Commandments
monument in Haskell County. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit erred
by using an unrealistic reasonable observer standard, strictly
requiring a clear secular purpose for the erection of the monument,
and attributing the divisiveness surrounding the lawsuit to an
unconstitutional effect of the monument. If the Tenth Circuit would
have adhered to the precedent of Van Orden, rather than incorrectly
distinguishing the facts of this case, the court would have found that
the government authorization for the erection of the monument in
Haskell County was a constitutionally acceptable, neutral
acknowledgement of the religious history of this nation.
A. The “Objective Reasonable Observer” Supplanted by
the Court’s Own Judgment
In analyzing the facts of Green, the Tenth Circuit used a
heightened and unrealistic “reasonable” observer standard whose
knowledge and observations became indistinguishable from the
knowledge and personal observations of the court. This standard is
not only unrealistic—it is unfaithful to the original standard set forth
by Justice O’Connor. The purpose of the endorsement test,
according to Justice O’Connor, is to prohibit government from
endorsing religion by “making adherence to a religion relevant in
any way to a person’s standing in the political community.” 71
69. Id. at 801 n.10.
70. Id. at 801–02.
71. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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This analysis clearly considers real people in a real community
who would actually feel the effect of government endorsement.
Although a reasonable observer in a small community would be
aware of many of the external activities relating to the monument,
such as the unveiling ceremony, many of the more nuanced facts of
Green that the Tenth Circuit used to distinguish the case from Van
Orden are irrelevant because they are not something that a typical
member of the community would reasonably be aware of.
The Tenth Circuit attributes an excessive amount of unrealistic
information to the reasonable observer, such as the cohesiveness of
the theme of the monuments, or the fact that the Mayflower
Compact was added to the monument after Mr. Bush received
authorization for the monument and without the specific approval of
the Board. 72 The court even admitted that it was not contemplating
an actual member of the community when it stated that “[i]n this
inquiry, ‘[u]ndoubtedly, the “objective observer” is presumed to
know far more than most actual members of a given community.’” 73
Although the court argues that this observer is not omniscient, 74 the
court fails to identify any knowledge that would not be available to
this omnipresent observer. The reasonable observer in this case has
apparently degenerated into little more than the reasonable
observations or personal bias of the court. Conversely, to uphold the
original conception of the reasonable observer as articulated by
Justice O’Connor, facts outside the realm of an ordinary community
member’s knowledge must be deemed as irrelevant when
determining the effect of the monument.
B. Political Divisiveness: A Product of Litigation, Not Establishment
Violation
In a misguided effort to distinguish Green from Van Orden, the
Tenth Circuit emphasized two issues. First, the court examined
divisive activities and statements that took place after the initiation of
the lawsuit in Green, but not in Van Orden. Second, the court
compared the relatively long period of time between the erection of
the monument and the initiation of the lawsuit in Van Orden with
72. Green, 568 F.3d at 808 n.18.
73. Id. at 800 (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 n.16
(10th Cir. 2008)).
74. Id.
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the comparatively short period of time between the erection of the
monument and the initiation of the lawsuit in Green.
First, the Tenth Circuit improperly suggested the divisive
activities that took place after the initiation of the lawsuit in Green
showed that the monument’s primary effect indicated an improper
government endorsement of religion. However, in Lynch, the
Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the
divisiveness that ensued after the commencement of the lawsuit was
evidence of a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court
explained, “A litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a
lawsuit, . . . create the appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it
as evidence of entanglement.” 75 Additionally, Justice O’Connor
stated in her concurring opinion that “the constitutional inquiry
should focus ultimately on the character of the government activity
that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself.” 76
Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Tenth Circuit to place
such weight on the comments and activities that took place after the
lawsuit began. The district court judge correctly recognized these
activities for nothing more than products of the litigation. “The
Monument did not begat the Rally. This lawsuit begat the Rally.” 77
Intuitively, it makes sense that activities created by a lawsuit should
not determine the constitutionality of the monument because many
community members would likely have been just as defensive if
someone had attempted to take down their World War II monument
or the monument honoring the Choctaw Nation. Such defensiveness
is merely a result of the offensive lawsuit, not necessarily a particular
endorsement of any one monument, and thus it should not be used
to distinguish the case.
Second, the Tenth Circuit improperly relied on the difference in
time between the erection of the monuments and the initiation of
the lawsuits to distinguish Green from Van Orden. Courts should be
wary of placing weight on the timing of the lawsuit as an indication
75. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684–85.
76. Id. at 689 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Richard W. Garnett, Religion,
Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1670 (2006) (arguing that
observations or predictions of “political division along religious lines” should not shape the
constitutional content allowed by the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, because
political division over religion is an unavoidable, and arguably beneficial, aspect of the political
life in a diverse and free society).
77. Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1280 (E.D. Okla. 2006),
rev’d sub nom. Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009).
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of constitutionality. Though an immediate reaction to a symbol may
be an indication of the symbol’s unconstitutional character, such a
reaction also may be merely the response of an overly sensitive
individual. Likewise, a slow reaction to a religious symbol may be
merely an indication of a less observant populace, or a populace that
agrees with the religion being endorsed. Thus, while timing may be
indicative of constitutionality, it is certainly not determinative of
whether government approval of a religious symbol violates the
Establishment Clause.
C. Resurrecting the Secular Requirements of O’Connor’s Refined
Lemon Test
In Van Orden, the Chief Justice, joined by a plurality of the
Court, stated, “Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the
larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not
useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has
erected on its Capitol grounds.” 78 Despite this clear statement from
the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit determined that it was still
“obliged here to apply the Lemon test, with Justice O’Connor’s
endorsement patina,” which resulted in the court placing excessive
emphasis on the requirement of a secular purpose. 79
The Tenth Circuit seemed to suggest that the only appropriate
acknowledgement of a religious symbol like the Ten
Commandments was secular acknowledgement. 80 Despite the
commissioners’ sincere acknowledgment of the historic nature of the
monument, 81 the court found that the commissioners’ recognition of
the religious nature of the monument signaled an endorsement of
religion. 82 This perception was clearly negated by the Court in Van
Orden, which stressed the importance of the dual nature of religious
symbols.
Of course, the Ten Commandments are religious—they were so
viewed at their inception and so remain. The monument, therefore,
has religious significance. According to Judeo-Christian belief, the

78. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687 (2005).
79. Green, 568 F.3d at 796.
80. Id. at 798 (“The Ten Commandments have a secular significance that government
may acknowledge.”).
81. Id. at 790.
82. Id. at 801–02.
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Ten Commandments were given to Moses by God on Mt. Sinai.
But Moses was a lawgiver as well as a religious leader. And the Ten
Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning . . . .
Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent
with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause. 83

Thus, in this context, the Court distanced itself from the Lemon
test’s requirement that a government action have a wholly secular
purpose. As long as the government’s recognition of the Ten
Commandments’ religious significance does not dwarf the
acknowledgment of historic significance, as in McCreary, 84 the
government does not violate the Establishment Clause by
recognizing the dual nature of a religious symbol. To hold otherwise
would be to relegate all sacred symbols recognized by the
government to nothing more than purely secular displays. 85
In Green, the commissioners clearly had a dual acknowledgement
of both the religious and secular nature of the Ten Commandments,
and the religious awareness never dwarfed the historic appreciation
of the monument. For instance, when granting approval for the
monument, the Commissioners exclusively discussed its historic
nature. 86 Furthermore, the district court found that, whatever the
commissioners’ views were on the religious nature of the monument,
certainly “the Commissioners’ belief in the texts’ historical
significance is sincere as well.” 87 Thus, the commissioners’ neutral
recognition of the religious nature of the monument should not have
been a factor that weighed towards a violation the Establishment
Clause.

83. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690.
84. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 857 (2005). The Court in this case
even held that a secretive religious motive is constitutionally permissible, because such a
motive, without more, does not make outsiders out of nonadherents. Id. at 863.
85. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 727 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The
crèche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for
commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the
religious tenor of a display of which it is an integral part. The city has its victory—but it is a
Pyrrhic one indeed. . . . Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred symbol.”).
86. Green, 568 F.3d at 790.
87. Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1283 (E.D. Okla. 2006).

16

DO NOT DELETE

3

3/6/2010 2:15 PM

Passive Acknowledgement or Active Promotion of Religion?

D. The Appropriate Outcome: Allowing Neutral Acknowledgement of
Our Nation’s Religious Heritage
The Tenth Circuit should have found that the Board’s approval
of the Ten Commandments monument was a neutral government
action upheld by the First Amendment. This conclusion naturally
follows from the fact that the government’s actions in Green reflect a
passive acknowledgement of the religious and historic nature of the
monument, as in Van Orden, as opposed to an active promotion of
religious ideals, as in McCreary.
In reality, the facts of Van Orden are incredibly similar to those
of Green. In both cases, a private citizen or group approached the
local government seeking approval to fund and erect a monument
prominently displaying the text of the Ten Commandments (unlike
McCreary where the government itself initiated a legislative order
requiring the display of the Ten Commandments). 88 In both Green
and Van Orden, the government gave approval for the monument,
chose the location for the monument on government property near a
government building, and sent two government officials to attend
the dedication ceremony of the monument. 89 Although these
government actions acknowledged the religious nature of the
monument, none of these actions gave special attention or favoritism
to the monument. Moreover, unlike McCreary, there was simply no
showing that any religious motivation on the part of the
commissioners dwarfed their appreciation of the historic significance
of the monument. 90 Rather, the monument was given neutral
government attention. Thus, the holding of Green should have been
controlled by the precedent of Van Orden, and the Tenth Circuit
should have held the government authorization of the Ten
Commandments monument in Haskell County did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the specific facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit found
that a reasonable observer would find the Ten Commandments
monument in Haskell County had the unconstitutional effect of

88. Green, 568 F.3d at 790; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681; McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850.
89. Green, 568 F.3d at 790–91; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.
90. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 852–55, 858.
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endorsing religion, thus violating the Establishment Clause. The
court came to this conclusion by applying an unrealistic and virtually
omniscient reasonable observer standard and by requiring that
government motivations in acknowledging a religious symbol be
clearly secular in purpose. The court further erred in overemphasizing the timing of and divisiveness surrounding the
litigation. Had the court followed the precedent set forth in Van
Orden, it would have concluded the monument was given neutral
treatment, rather than endorsement, through the government’s
passive acknowledgement of the religious and historic nature of the
Ten Commandments in connection with our nation’s religious
heritage.
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